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 Abstract 
Successful social interactions rely on the ability to make accurate judgments based on 
social cues as well as the ability to control the influence of internal or external affective 
information on those judgments. Prior research suggests that individuals with 
schizophrenia misinterpret social stimuli and this misinterpretation contributes to 
impaired social functioning. We tested the hypothesis that for people with schizophrenia 
social judgments are abnormally influenced by affective information. 23 schizophrenia 
and 35 healthy control participants rated the trustworthiness of faces following the 
presentation of neutral, negative (threat-related), or positive affective primes. Results 
showed that all participants rated faces as less trustworthy following negative affective 
primes compared to faces that followed neutral or positive primes. Importantly, this effect 
was significantly more pronounced for schizophrenia participants, suggesting that 
schizophrenia may be characterised by an exaggerated influence of negative affective 
information on social judgment. Furthermore, the extent that the negative affective prime 
influenced  trustworthiness judgments was significantly associated with patients’ severity 
of positive symptoms, particularly feelings of persecution. These findings suggest that for 
people with schizophrenia negative affective information contributes to an interpretive 
bias, consistent with paranoid ideation, when judging the trustworthiness of others. This 
bias may contribute to social impairments in schizophrenia.  
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Introduction:  
Successful social interactions rely on the ability to make accurate social judgments of 
others based on a variety of complex cues indicating a person’s trait and state qualities: Is 
this person trustworthy, competent, or domineering? Are they feeling angry, 
disappointed, or bored?  These social judgments influence our overall impressions of 
others and are directly related to our social behavior (Adolphs, 2002; Todorov, 2008). It 
is well established that schizophrenia patients do not accurately judge social cues, such as 
facial expressions (Couture, Penn, & Roberts, 2006). Importantly, these deficits in social 
and affective judgments predict social functioning (Hooker & Park, 2002; Poole, Tobias, 
& Vinogradov, 2000) and mediate the relationship between neurocognition and 
functional outcome (Brekke, Kay, Lee, & Green, 2005; Gard, Fisher, Garrett, Genevsky, 
& Vinogradov, 2009). Identifying the mechanisms that contribute to the misinterpretation 
of social cues in schizophrenia could facilitate the development of effective interventions 
and ultimately improve outcome. However, at this point, the factors that influence social 
interpretations in schizophrenia are unclear. 
One possible mechanism is that internal or external affective information is exerting 
inappropriate influence over social judgments and consequently affecting social 
functioning. That is, schizophrenia patients may have an impaired ability to control the 
influence of affective information on social judgments. Affective priming studies with 
healthy adults demonstrates that judgments, including judgments about a person’s state 
and trait characteristics, are influenced in a mood-congruent manner by the observer’s 
affective state and/or by affective information in the environment that may impact 
affective state (Forgas, 1995; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). This Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     4 
 
 
bias occurs even when the internal or external affective information has an incidental 
cause and is irrelevant to the present judgment, thereby contributing to misinterpretations. 
For example, people are more likely to judge a face as happy after a positive mood prime, 
such as viewing a pleasant film, and more likely to judge a face as sad, after a negative 
mood prime, such as viewing a sad film (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, Margolin, & Innes-
Ker, 2000). Disorders that are characterized by the persistent elevation of an affective 
state show interpretive biases even in the absence of priming (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005); people with major depressive disorder are more likely to identify ambiguous facial 
expressions as sad and less likely to identify them as happy (Joormann & Gotlib, 2006). 
Affective priming reveals these biases in formerly depressed patients who report normal 
mood (LeMoult, Joormann, Sherdell, Wright, & Gotlib, 2009). Importantly, these 
interpretive biases contribute to the onset and maintenance of illness (Bouhuys, Geerts, & 
Gordijn, 1999) and are now a target for treatment (MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). 
Despite the vast literature on social and affective perception deficits in schizophrenia 
(Edwards, Jackson, & Pattison, 2002; Marwick & Hall, 2008), reports of interpretive bias 
are surprisingly rare. However, schizophrenia is a heterogeneous disorder in which 
internal affective state may be variable across different subtypes and stages of illness 
(Arndt, Andreasen, Flaum, Miller, & Nopoulos, 1995; Herbener & Harrow, 2002). 
Without direct manipulation of affect, the variation in internal affective state across 
participants may obscure social judgment biases that exist on an individual level. 
Furthermore, incidental affective state is most likely to influence judgment when 
cognitive appraisals of affect are consistent with the nature of the judgment (Dunn & 
Schweitzer, 2005; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Feelings of paranoia are common among Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     5 
 
 
individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Tandon, Nasrallah, & Keshavan, 
2009). Therefore, schizophrenia patients should be most susceptible to interpretive bias 
when feelings of threat are elevated and the social judgment pertains to interpersonal 
safety.  
Indeed, the studies which have demonstrated information processing biases suggest 
that social cues are often interpreted in a manner consistent with paranoid feelings and 
that paranoid patients exhibit this bias more than non-paranoid patients (Green & 
Phillips, 2004). For example, schizophrenia patients tend to identify a person as looking 
at them rather than away from them (Hooker & Park, 2005) – a self-referential bias that is 
more pronounced in paranoid patients as compared to non-paranoid patients (Rosse, 
Kendrick, Wyatt, Isaac, & Deutsch, 1994). In addition, signal detection analyses of facial 
affect recognition performance indicates that schizophrenia patients are less likely to 
interpret facial expressions as happy and more likely to interpret facial expressions as sad 
or fearful (Tsoi et al., 2008). This bias might be particularly related to paranoid 
symptoms, as prior studies show that paranoid patients have an enhanced ability to 
identify fear (Kline, Smith, & Ellis, 1992; Phillips et al., 1999) even though they are also 
less likely to look at important facial features (Green, Williams, & Davidson, 2003) and 
to incorporate information about social context (Green, Waldron, & Coltheart, 2007; 
Green, Waldron, Simpson, & Coltheart, 2008). These apparently conflicting findings 
would be expected if internal feelings of threat are influencing the social judgment. 
Initial evidence from affective priming studies in schizophrenia patients supports this 
hypothesis (Hoschel & Irle, 2001; Suslow, Roestel, & Arolt, 2003). When positive, 
negative and neutral facial expression primes were subliminally presented prior to a Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     6 
 
 
valence judgment, schizophrenia patients were more likely than control subjects to judge 
neutral faces and objects as unpleasant after the negative expression prime. There was no 
difference between groups after the positive prime. This demonstration of affective 
priming effects on valence judgments provides initial evidence of abnormalities in 
schizophrenia. However, more targeted investigations of specific factors concerning the 
affective prime and type of judgment are necessary to fully understand the mechanisms 
and consequences of interpretive biases in schizophrenia. 
Here we investigate interpretive bias by presenting threat-related pictures and 
measuring the influence of that affective information on a trait judgment pertaining to 
interpersonal safety, i.e., the trustworthiness of unfamiliar people. Traits, such as 
trustworthiness, concern a person’s character and are perceived as more stable than 
emotional states. Therefore, interpretive bias in trustworthiness judgments may have 
long-lasting impact on decisions to avoid interpersonal relationships.  
Since paranoia, including suspiciousness and distrust of others, is a common 
symptom of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Nayani & David, 1996; Tandon et al., 
2009), it is reasonable to predict that schizophrenia patients would judge faces as less 
trustworthy than healthy controls. However, prior studies that have investigated this 
hypothesis without affective priming have produced mixed results including evidence 
that schizophrenia patients judge faces as less trustworthy (Pinkham, Hopfinger, 
Pelphrey, Piven, & Penn, 2008), more trustworthy (Baas, van't Wout, Aleman, & Kahn, 
2008), and no different than control subjects (Couture, Penn, Addington, Woods, & 
Perkins, 2008). Identifying the influence of incidental affective information on 
trustworthiness judgments could help explain these conflicting findings. Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     7 
 
 
 
In the present study, the influence of affective information on social judgment was 
investigated with the following predictions: 1) relative to healthy control participants, 
schizophrenia patients will show an exaggerated effect of a threat-related affective prime 
on social judgment, such that they will rate the same face as less trustworthy after the 
threat prime as compared to the neutral prime. No difference in the influence of the 
positive affective prime between groups is expected; 2) the influence of the threat-related 
affective prime on trustworthiness judgments will be most extreme in patients with 
paranoid symptoms. Participants completed a task in which they judged the 
trustworthiness of unfamiliar faces. The presence of affective information was 
manipulated by showing a negative (threatening), neutral, and positive picture prime just 
prior to the social judgment. Influence of the threat-related prime on the trustworthiness 
judgment was measured in two ways: 1) the trustworthiness rating after each prime 
condition - this provides information about group differences in the presence or absence 
of threat-related information; 2) the difference between trustworthiness ratings after the 
threat-related prime and trustworthiness ratings after the neutral prime. This difference 
score provides a priming effect index because it represents each person’s shift in 
judgment as a result of the affective prime. Therefore, it accounts for individual response 
tendencies, such as a tendency to rate faces as more or less trustworthy, in the absence of 
affective information.  
 
Methods: 
Participants Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     8 
 
 
23 volunteers with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and 35 non-
psychiatric, healthy adult volunteers participated in the study. Schizophrenia subjects 
were recruited from community mental health centres and outpatient clinics in the San 
Francisco Bay area.  Diagnosis was assessed via the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002) and 
information from the subject’s caretaker, medical team, and medical record. Symptom 
severity was assessed with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale-Extended 
(PANSS-E) (Kay, Opler, & Fiszbein, 1987; Poole et al., 2000). Trained research staff 
conducted the clinical assessments. Final diagnosis and PANSS-E ratings were reached 
by consensus between two raters and supervised by a licensed psychiatrist (S.V.). 
PANSS-E ratings for positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms are reported. IQ was 
assessed with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) (Wechsler, 1999). 
Inclusion criteria were: diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, age 18-60 
years, and English as a primary language (learned before age 12).  Exclusion criteria 
were: IQ below 70, history of head trauma, neurological or major medical illness, or 
active substance dependence (DSM-IV criteria) within the past six months.  
Healthy adult control subjects were recruited from the same geographic area. 
Control subjects were screened for schizotypal traits using the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire (Raine, 1991) and screened for psychiatric, neurological and general 
medical problems with self-report questionnaires and a structured clinical interview that 
assessed past and current Axis I psychological symptoms, use of 
psychological/psychiatric services, psychiatric and non-psychiatric medication use, 
academic and learning history, and general medical health including neurological and/or Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     9 
 
 
perception problems.  IQ was assessed with the WASI. Exclusion criteria were:  SPQ 
score above 30, IQ below 70, current use of psychotropic medication, history of or 
current psychiatric or neurological disorder (including substance abuse), or head injury 
with loss of consciousness. Trained research staff conducted the screening. Diagnoses 
relevant to exclusion were reached by consensus and supervised by a licensed clinical 
psychologist (C.H.). The study was approved by the ethical review boards at the 
University of California, Berkeley and University of California, San Francisco. 
Participants gave written informed consent. Subjects received nominal payment for their 
participation.  
Demographic data for the two groups are summarized in Table 1. Despite efforts 
to match the two groups on demographic variables, the groups differed in age, education 
and gender. These variables were entered as covariates in the statistical analyses.  
 
Task and Stimuli 
Participants completed a social judgment task [adapted from (Adolphs, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 1998)] in which they rated the trustworthiness of unfamiliar faces. An affective 
prime, i.e. an emotionally provocative scene, was presented just prior to the face. Valence 
ratings of the affective primes were collected, in a separate session, after completion of 
the social judgment task.  
In the social judgment task (See Figure 1), participants were told that they would 
see a series of scenes followed by faces. They were asked to rate each face on a 7 point 
scale according to how trustworthy the person appeared (-3 = very untrustworthy, +3 = 
very trustworthy). It was emphasized that the scenes and the faces were not related, and Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     10 
 
 
that the participant’s job was to rate the faces alone. Instructions for how to evaluate 
trustworthiness were identical to Adolphs et al. (1998). Participants were asked to 
“imagine trusting the person in a very serious situation, for instance, with all your money 
or with your life”. 
There were two alternate forms of the task. (Two forms were created for later use 
in a treatment study).  Each form of the task contained 49 black and white photographs of 
unfamiliar male and female faces in natural poses taken from the 100 face stimulus set in 
Adolphs et al. (1998). Each face was rated for trustworthiness after each of the three 
prime conditions [negative (threatening), neutral, and positive] for a total of 147 trials. 
Normed trustworthiness ratings of the faces used in form 1 ranged from -2.45 to 1.57; in 
form 2 from -2.66 – 1.83 (Adolphs et al., 1998).  The faces in each form did not differ in 
ratings of trustworthiness based on the normative sample [Form 1 M(SD)= -.25, (1.14); 
Form 2 M(SD) = -.25, (1.17)],  t(96) = -.004, p = .997].  
Affective primes were taken from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). 49 pictures in each condition were selected. 
Threat-related negative primes were IAPS pictures that were identified by a group of UC 
Berkeley undergraduates as the most threatening but least disgusting of the picture set. 
The selected threat-related primes included pictures of snakes, spiders, weapons, and 
interpersonal assault. Population means of valence and arousal ratings are published in 
the IAPS manual; the rating scale is from 1 (unpleasant valence/low arousal) to 9 
(pleasant valence/high arousal). Mean valence rating from the IAPS manual of these 
threat-related primes was 2.89 (SD = .73) and the mean arousal rating was 6.28 (SD = 
.57). Neutral primes were neutral on valence (M = 4.99, SD = .3) and low on arousal (M = Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     11 
 
 
2.91, SD = .6); typically portraying household objects.  Positive primes were positive on 
valence (M = 7.62, SD = .39) and high on arousal (M = 5.48, SD = .85); typically 
portraying sports and food. Paired Samples t-tests on the normed ratings confirmed that 
the negative affective primes were significantly more unpleasant (t(48) = 14.63, p < .001) 
and arousing (t(48) = 27.38, p <.001) than neutral primes. Positive primes were 
significantly more pleasant (t(48) = 38.39, p<.001) and arousing (t(48) = 20.25, p<.001) 
than neutral primes. Positive and negative affective primes differed on valence (t(48) = 
36.98, p<.001) and arousal (t(48) = 5.63, p<.001), such that the negative prime pictures 
were more unpleasant and arousing than the positive primes.  
Primes were randomly assigned to faces and the face-prime pairs were presented 
in a fixed, pseudo-random order; none of the faces appeared twice in a row. Primes were 
presented for 1 second, followed by the face presented for 7 seconds (or until the subject 
responded), followed by an inter-trial interval of 1.5 seconds. The subject’s 
trustworthiness rating was the dependent variable of interest. Subjects completed the task 
on a Dell Laptop computer and the stimuli were presented with E-Prime software.  
Validation of Affective Primes: 
Participants (21 controls and 19 schizophrenia) returned to the lab on a separate 
day and rated the pleasantness of the each of the IAPS pictures that were used as affective 
primes. Pictures were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from -3 (extremely unpleasant) to 
+3 (extremely pleasant).  The primes were presented in random order, remaining on the 
screen until participants responded.  
Data Analysis Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     12 
 
 
Data analysis was conducted with SPSS. Variables were screened for normalcy 
and outliers, defined as 2.5 or more standard deviations away from the mean of each 
group. Outliers were replaced with the group mean accordingly. Two scores were 
replaced: one negative response in the control group, one positive response in the patient 
group.   
Priming Effect Index: Negative and Positive Difference Scores 
Negative difference scores were calculated by subtracting trustworthiness ratings 
after the neutral prime from trustworthiness ratings after the negative affective prime. 
Positive difference scores were calculated by subtracting trustworthiness ratings after the 
neutral prime from trustworthiness ratings after the positive affective prime.      
Hypothesis Testing 
Group differences in the influence of affective primes (Hypothesis 1), were 
examined with two ANCOVA models: 1) 2 x 3 ANCOVA of trustworthiness ratings with 
diagnosis (controls vs. schizophrenia) as the between subjects factor and affective prime 
(negative, positive, neutral) as the within subjects factor; 2) 2 x 2 ANCOVA of difference 
scores with diagnosis (controls vs. schizophrenia) as the between subjects factor and 
difference scores (negative, positive) as the within subjects factor. Age, education, and 
gender were entered as covariates in both models. Independent and Paired Samples T-
tests were used to validate observed effects of the prime. Statistics are reported with two-
tailed tests. However, since our hypotheses specify the direction of effect, one-tailed tests 
were accepted and noted when used. Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     13 
 
 
Pearson bivariate correlations (two-tailed) were used to determine whether 
positive symptoms, particularly levels of suspiciousness, were significantly associated 
with the effect of threat-related primes on trustworthiness judgments (Hypothesis 2).  
 
Results:  
Hypothesis #1: Influence of threat-related primes on trustworthiness judgments will 
be significantly greater in schizophrenia versus healthy control participants 
Mean trustworthiness ratings, difference scores and between group statistics are 
reported in Table 2.  ANCOVA results for trustworthiness ratings after each prime 
condition showed a significant diagnosis by prime interaction. There was no main effect 
of education, age, gender or diagnosis. Independent Samples T-tests demonstrate that 
schizophrenia participants rated the faces as less trustworthy than healthy controls after 
the negative affective prime. This demonstrates that schizophrenia participants have an 
interpretive bias after the negative affective prime. However, there was no difference 
between groups after the neutral prime or positive prime. Importantly, results for the 
neutral prime show that in the absence of negative affective information there is no 
difference between groups.   
ANCOVA results for the difference scores show a significant prime by diagnosis 
interaction. There was no main effect of education, gender or diagnosis. Independent 
Samples T-tests show that schizophrenia patients had a greater shift in judgment after the 
negative affective prime relative to the neutral prime (p=.029, one-tailed). There was no 
significant difference between groups in the positive difference score. Although the 
influence of the positive prime was non-significant for both groups, it influenced Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     14 
 
 
judgment in opposite directions which most likely contributed to the prime by diagnosis 
interaction.  This analysis accounts for responses after the neutral prime and demonstrates 
that the negative affective prime had a greater influence on trust judgments in 
schizophrenia participants. Although the effect sizes are small, the results are in the 
predicted direction and consistent across analyses. Results are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Validation of Priming Effect 
Analyses were conducted to verify that the group difference in priming effect was 
not due to group differences in effectiveness of the priming paradigm or valence ratings 
of the affective primes.  
1) Was the priming paradigm effective for both groups? 
Within each group, Paired Sample T-tests were conducted on the trustworthiness 
ratings to verify that the priming procedure was effective. Results demonstrate that both 
groups were significantly influenced by the negative affective prime. Faces were rated as 
significantly less trustworthy after the negative affective prime as compared to the neutral 
prime for healthy control (t(34) = 2.85, p = .007, d = .98) as well as schizophrenia 
participants (t(22) = 2.32, p = .03, d = .98). However, there was no significant difference 
between trustworthiness ratings after the positive affective prime as compared to the 
neutral prime for either the healthy control (t(34) = .40, p = .70, d = .14) or schizophrenia 
participants (t(22) = .41, p = .68, d = .18 ). The significant influence of the negative 
affective prime in the healthy control group is consistent with prior research on 
interpretive biases and suggests that the difference between healthy controls and 
schizophrenia patients here is not due to task-related confounds (i.e. the task was less Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     15 
 
 
effective for healthy controls). The findings also suggest that the positive affective prime 
did not significantly influence trustworthiness judgments for either group.  
2) Did the groups rate the affective primes differently?  
Independent Samples T-tests (Table 2) revealed no significant difference between 
groups in the pleasantness ratings of the negative, neutral, or positive primes. This is 
consistent with prior data showing that there is no difference between schizophrenia 
participants and healthy controls in ratings of valence and arousal and response to IAPS 
pictures (Herbener, 2008; Herbener, Song, Khine, & Sweeney, 2008; Kring, Barrett, & 
Gard, 2003; Kring & Moran, 2008). Thus, differences in trustworthiness ratings shown 
here can be attributed to differences in the influence of the primes on subsequent 
judgments of trustworthiness, not to differences in affective ratings.  
 
Hypothesis #2: Influence of the threat-related primes will be more extreme in 
schizophrenia participants with high levels of paranoia 
Zero-order correlations between symptoms, trustworthiness ratings, and 
difference scores are shown in Table 3. Correlations with the trustworthiness ratings 
show that ratings after the negative affective prime were significantly related to 
symptoms of suspiciousness/persecution. As predicted, schizophrenia participants with a 
higher level of suspiciousness/persecution were more likely to rate faces as less 
trustworthy after the negative affective prime. The relationship between trustworthiness 
ratings after the negative affective prime and the positive symptom cluster was in the 
predicted direction but did not reach significance. There was no relationship between 
trustworthiness ratings after the neutral and positive primes and any positive symptoms. Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     16 
 
 
Interestingly, there was a significant positive correlation between ratings after neutral and 
positive primes and the disorganized symptom cluster. Specifically, greater conceptual 
disorganization and incoherent speech was associated with higher trustworthy ratings 
after the neutral prime and greater incoherent speech was associated with higher 
trustworthiness ratings after the positive prime.   
Analysis of the difference scores shows a significant relationship between the 
positive symptom cluster and negative affective prime difference scores (see table 3 and 
figure 3). Three of the five component symptoms of the positive symptom cluster were 
significantly correlated with negative difference scores: unusual thought content, 
delusions, and suspiciousness/persecution (table 3b). Suspiciousness/persecution showed 
the largest correlation suggesting that the extent to which negative affect influences 
trustworthiness judgments varies according to feelings of suspiciousness/persecution.  
The negative difference score analysis demonstrates that a higher level of positive 
symptoms is associated with a greater shift in judgment as a result of the negative 
affective prime relative to the neutral prime. There was no significant correlation between 
the negative difference score and negative or disorganized symptoms; there was no 
significant relationship between the positive difference score and any symptoms. 
 
Discussion  
 
This study examined whether affective information had an exaggerated influence 
on social judgment in schizophrenia. Negative (threat-related), neutral, and positive 
affective primes were presented just prior to judging the trustworthiness of an unfamiliar Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     17 
 
 
face. Two main findings emerged from our study. First, relative to healthy control 
subjects, schizophrenia patients’ judgments of trustworthiness were more influenced by 
negative affective primes, such that they judged the person as less trustworthy after the 
negative affective prime. Second, the extent of this influence was associated with positive 
symptoms, particularly feelings of suspiciousness and persecution; the greater the 
severity of positive symptoms, the greater the influence of the negative affective primes 
on trustworthiness evaluations.   
These findings demonstrate an interpretive bias, consistent with paranoia, for 
evaluations of trustworthiness in schizophrenia. This interpretive bias was only apparent 
after the presentation of negative affective primes. There was no difference between 
schizophrenia patients and healthy control participants in their ratings of trustworthiness 
after the neutral prime and there was also no relationship between positive symptoms and 
trustworthiness ratings after the neutral prime. The influence of the negative affective 
prime was not due to schizophrenia participants perceiving the threat-related pictures as 
more unpleasant than the healthy control group, nor can the effect be explained by an 
excess of general affective priming in the schizophrenia sample as there was no 
difference between the groups in the influence of positive affective primes. This pattern 
of results indicates that schizophrenia participants, especially those with positive 
symptoms, are particularly sensitive to the influence of incidental threat-related negative 
affective information on judgments of trustworthiness.  
These findings may help explain inconsistencies in prior studies that investigated 
trustworthiness judgments without affective priming. Some studies report no difference 
in trustworthiness ratings between healthy control and schizophrenia participants (Baas, Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     18 
 
 
Aleman et al., 2008; Couture et al., 2008), yet others demonstrate that schizophrenia 
participants (Baas, van't Wout et al., 2008) and those at risk for schizophrenia (Couture et 
al., 2008) judge faces as more trustworthy than healthy controls. However, studies that 
consider symptom profile indicate that schizophrenia participants with paranoid 
symptoms judge faces as less trustworthy than both non-paranoid (Pinkham et al., 2008) 
and healthy control participants (Couture et al., 2009). 
Collectively, these studies suggest that schizophrenia patients’ trustworthiness 
judgments may not be stable, but rather that these social judgments are influenced by 
factors such as symptom profile and severity, internal affective state, and/or incidental 
emotional provocations that may impact affective state. Our study specifically 
investigated these factors. Similar to prior research, we found that across a group of 
patients with varying levels of symptoms, judgments of trustworthiness did not differ 
between schizophrenia patients and controls when the prime was affectively neutral. 
Thus, without specifically manipulating negative affect or the presence of negative 
affective information through priming, interpretive bias in trustworthiness judgments was 
not apparent. Our finding that patients with a high degree of paranoid symptoms were 
most influenced by the negative affective prime suggests that threatening contexts may 
influence social judgments more in paranoid patients as compared to patients without 
paranoid symptoms. Interestingly, the participants in Pinkham et al. (2008) made their 
judgments while undergoing fMRI scanning, a context that most people consider mildly 
anxiety-provoking and aversive. It is possible that the negative context of the scanner 
environment may have led paranoid patients to judge faces as untrustworthy in that study. 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that, in the absence of negative affective priming, Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     19 
 
 
disorganized symptoms are associated with judging faces as more trustworthy. Although 
prior studies which showed schizophrenia spectrum participants as judging faces as more 
trustworthy (Baas, van't Wout et al., 2008) did not report symptom severity, participants 
in these studies may have had a high level of disorganized symptoms.   
While the current results demonstrate that incidental threat-related information 
has an exaggerated influence on trust judgments for schizophrenia patients, more research 
is needed to identify the underlying cause of this effect. Research with healthy adults 
shows that multiple factors contribute to the influence of affect on trustworthiness 
judgments, including the specific emotion that is primed, salience of the priming source, 
the type of judgment, and characteristics of both the target and the observer (Dunn & 
Schweitzer, 2005; Todorov, 2008). Certain aspects of schizophrenia illness may interact 
with these factors to cause an exaggerated influence of affect on trust judgments. Our 
findings here suggest an interaction between primed emotion and psychotic symptoms on 
trust judgments of unfamiliar faces. We identify two possible mechanisms that are neither 
exhaustive nor mutually exclusive and are proposed here to stimulate further research. 
One possibility, consistent with information processing and cognitive psychology 
theories, is that the threat-related primes activated paranoid cognitive schemas which then 
influenced trust assessments. Another possibility, consistent with neurocognitive models 
in schizophrenia, is that deficits in cognitive control skills contributed to the inability to 
regulate the influence of threat-related information or feelings on judgment.  
First, although we did not assess specific emotional state after the prime, it is 
likely that the threat-related primes provoked feelings of fear, even if those feelings were 
relatively mild. Fear is associated with specific action tendencies (i.e. to avoid or escape Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     20 
 
 
danger) and cognitive appraisals, including appraisals that escape is uncertain and outside 
of one’s personal control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Trusting someone “with your 
money or your life” (as we asked our subjects to imagine doing) involves relinquishing 
personal control to another person and leaving oneself vulnerable to potential 
exploitation. Taking such a risk requires certainty about the intentions of the other person 
and the situational demands that may influence them. Given the type of judgment, 
emotions that are associated with appraisals of uncertainty and low personal control, such 
as fear, will have the most influence on trustworthiness judgments. When people feel 
fearful they overestimate potential dangers, are less likely to take risks, and more likely to 
avoid uncertain situations (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). These effects of fear have been 
demonstrated for decisions of financial and physical risks (Au, Chan, Wang, & 
Vertinsky, 2003; Chou, Lee, & Ho, 2007; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003) 
and shown here for decisions concerning interpersonal risk – i.e. whether or not to trust 
someone. Furthermore, appraisals associated with fear may activate core belief systems 
(schemas) related to psychosis, such as the belief that other people, particularly 
unfamiliar people, may have malevolent intentions (Beck & Rector, 2005). Our data 
suggests that paranoid ideation may not influence trust evaluations unless activated by 
threat-related information. Prior research shows that identifying the source of emotional 
provocations diminishes the influence of that affective state on unrelated judgments 
(Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Therefore, interventions which help 
patients identify environmental cues or experiences that provoke negative affect might 
improve both paranoid symptoms and interpretive biases related to those symptoms.   Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     21 
 
 
In addition, deficits in cognitive control skills, such as attentional control, which 
are characteristic of schizophrenia, may contribute to the exaggerated influence of 
affective state on trust judgments. The influence of emotionally provocative stimuli on 
affective state and subsequent behaviour can be regulated by cognitive strategies such as 
evaluation, inhibition, and attentional control (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Hooker, 
Gyurak, Verosky, Miyakawa, & Ayduk, 2009; Lieberman et al., 2007). Schizophrenia 
patients consistently demonstrate behavioural impairments in these skills (Henry et al., 
2007; Reichenberg & Harvey, 2007).  Our results are consistent with the idea that 
positive symptoms may interact with cognitive control deficits, resulting in difficulties 
regulating the influence of negative affect on trustworthiness judgments. Although the 
current data cannot address this hypothesis directly, future research could investigate 
whether cognitive control skills predict the extent to which negative affect influences 
judgment. Evidence of this association would suggest that improving cognitive control 
skills might help patients control the influence of affect on judgment.     
  The current study has several limitations that should be addressed in future 
research. First, although we interpret the results as suggesting that the threat-related 
primes provoked feelings of fear which then influenced trust judgments, we did not 
assess emotional state after the primes. Therefore, alternative explanations should be 
considered and tested. For example, threat-related primes could activate the cognitive 
category of fear rather than the emotional response and/or the threat-related primes could 
have provoked emotional responses other than fear. Second, the positive affective primes 
did not influence trust judgments for either group, suggesting that these primes may not 
have been effective. The positive primes were not as arousing as the negative primes, Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     22 
 
 
indicating that arousal level may contribute to the influence of affect on judgment. 
Content of the positive primes was also more diverse than the negative primes and 
therefore the influence may have been more diffuse. Future research should manipulate 
and assess specific positive and negative emotional states, such as gratitude and anger, 
which might have different effects on trust judgments (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). 
Finally, although differences in age, education and gender were statistically controlled for 
in our analyses, future studies should replicate the current results with appropriately 
matched samples.  
  In summary, the current study demonstrates that schizophrenia is associated with 
an interpretive bias, consistent with feelings of paranoia, when judging the 
trustworthiness of others. These findings have implications for how schizophrenia 
patients interact with others: an impaired ability to make accurate social judgements due 
to the inappropriate influence of negative affective information could be an important 
contributing factor to the chronic and debilitating social behaviour deficits seen in the 
disorder.  Additional research may facilitate the development of interventions whereby 
patients learn to develop skills and strategies to aid in the regulation of affective 
information during social judgements and thus minimize misinterpretations. 
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Table 1: Demographics & Clinical Details
SZ Subjects Control Subjects Differences Between Groups
Gender (F/M) 2F/21M 13F/22M χ2 (1) = 13.52, p < .001
Age: mean (SD), [range] 44.22 (10.3),[23-59] 49.17 (7.65), [24-62] t(56) = 2.10, p = .041, d = .56a
Education: mean (SD), [range] 13.35 (2.2), [9-20] 14.40 (1.40), [12-16] t(56) = 2.26, p = .028, d = .60
WASI IQ: mean (SD), [range] 102 (17.4), [73-138]  111 (10.7), [87-126] t(40) = 1.97, p = .055, d = .53
Diagnosis: n [%]
Schizoaffective: 8 [34.78%] - -
Schizophrenia: 15 [65.22%] - -
SZ Subtypes: Paranoid 7/15 - -
Catatonic 1/15 - -
Undifferentiated 6/15 - -
Residual 1/15 - -
- -
Age of Onset: mean (SD), [range] 19.75 (6.2), [5-31] - -
Length of Illness: mean (SD), [range] 26.00 (12.4), [5-47] - -
Antipsychotic Medication: n [%] b - -
Typical: 3 [13.4%] - -
Atypical: 18 [78.26%] - -
PANSS Symptoms : mean (SD), [range] - -
Positive Symptoms 2.44 (1.0), [1 - 4] - -
Negative Symptoms 2.23 (.8), [1 - 3.9] - -
Disorganized Symptoms 1.74 (.7), [1 - 3.4] - -
aCohen’s d effect size
b Medication details were obtained for 23/25 patientsSchizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     29 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  All behavioral results including trustworthiness ratings after each prime condition, difference scores (i.e. index of 
priming effect) and the pleasantness ratings of the  affective primes
Control SZ Difference between groups
Trustworthiness Ratings: mean (SD)
Negative Prime 0.41 (0.8) -0.15 (1.07) t(56) = 2.30, p = .03, d = .61a
Neutral Prime 0.57 (.72) 0.39 (.65) t(56) = 0.94, p = .35, d = .25
Positive Prime 0.54 (62) 0.42 (.60) t(56) = 0.72, p = .48, d = .19
Mixed ANCOVA revealed Affective prime * Diagnosis interaction: F(2, 106) = 4.36, p = .02; η2
p = .08 b c
Difference Scores: mean (SD)
Negative Difference Score -0.15 (.32) -0.54 (1.11) t(56) = 1.94, p = .057d, d = .52
Positive Difference Score -0.03 (.37) 0.03 (.38) t(56) = .573, p = .569, d = .15
Mixed ANCOVA revealed Difference score * Diagnosis interaction: F(1,53) = 6.00, p = .02; η2
p = .10 b
Pleasantness of Prime: mean (SD)
Negative -2.37 (.36) -2.47 (.47) t(38) = .683, p = .50, d = .22
Neutral .33 (.40) .39 (.63) t(38) = .405, p = .70, d = .13
Positive 2.00 (.64) 1.61 (.69) t(38) = 1.56, p = .13, d = .51
Mixed ANCOVA revealed main effect of prime: F (2,70) = 5.518, p = .006; η2
p= .14; no prime *diagnosis interaction: F (2,70) = .904, p = .41; η2
p = .03 b
a  Cohen’s d effect size
b Age, education, & gender were included as covariates of no interest. Results showed no main effects of these covariates. 
cη2
p= partial eta squared effect size
dp=.029, one-tailed test. Because the hypothesis specified the direction of effect (i.e. SZ would rate as less trustworthy) the one tailed t-test is used here. Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     30 
 
 
 
Table 3a: Pearson correlations of symptom clusters with difference scores and raw 
trustworthiness ratings
Symptom Clusters
Positive Symptoms Negative Symptoms  Disorganized Symptoms
Negative Difference Score -0.51* 0.18 -0.17
Positive Difference Score -0.11 0.11 -0.15
Raw Trustworthiness Ratings: 
Negative Prime -0.30 0.20 0.11
Neutral Prime 0.38 0.02 0.48*
Positive Prime 0.35 0.09 0.43*
Table 3b:  Pearson correlations of symptom components of positive, negative, and disorganized symptom clusters with difference scores and raw 
trustworthiness ratings
Difference Scores Trustworthiness Ratings
Negative Difference Score Positive Difference Score Negative Prime Neutral Prime Positive Prime
Positive Symptom Components
unusual thought content -0.46* -0.26 -0.24 0.39 0.26
delusions -0.50* -0.14 -0.29 0.38 0.33
grandiosity -0.16 -0.01 -0.05 0.18 0.19
suspiciousness -0.56* -0.19 -0.43* 0.26 0.16
hallucinatory behavior -0.25 0.15 -0.08 0.22 0.34
Negative Symptom Components
emotional withdrawal 0.11 0.23 -0.01 -0.20 -0.08
social withdrawal 0.17 0.28 0.16 -0.02 0.16
lack of spontaneity 0.25 0.14 0.27 0.01 0.09
poor rapport 0.24 -0.05 0.28 0.05 0.03
blunted affect 0.13 -0.13 0.06 -0.12 -0.21
motor retardation 0.00 -0.08 0.14 0.22 0.19
disturbance of volition 0.07 0.11 0.22 0.23 0.32
Disorganized Symptom Components
conceptual disorganization -0.29 -0.35 0.01 0.51* 0.34
incoherent speech -0.01 -0.09 0.27 0.47* 0.45*
poverty of speech content -0.08 0.06 0.11 0.32 0.39
inappropriate affect -0.26 -0.31 -0.02 0.41 0.25
bizarre appearance 0.13 0.28 0.11 -0.04 0.14
bizarre social behavior -0.25 0.31 -0.10 0.39 0.58*
* p < .05 Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     31 
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subject responds
Figure 1: Social Judgment Task. Subjects 
were asked to rate the trustworthiness of 
unfamiliar faces following a negative (threat-
related), neutral, and positive prime. Schizophrenia: Affective Priming and Social Judgments     32 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Influence of the prime was calculated by subtracting ratings after the neutral prime 
from ratings after the negative and positive primes, thus zero indicates no priming effect.  
Schizophrenia patients showed a greater priming effect such that their trustworthiness ratings 
were significantly lower after the negative prime relative to the neutral compared to control 
group.  There was no group difference between positive priming difference scores. 
* Diagnosis * Prime Interaction 
p = 0.02
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Figure 3: The extent to which the negative prime influenced schizophrenia patients’ 
trustworthiness ratings was significantly related to positive symptoms. The greater 
severity of positive symptoms, the less trustworthy patients rated faces following 
the negative prime relative to the neutral prime.  
*Significant correlation, p =.014 